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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to examine the extent to which there is shared 
meaning of the concept of auditor independence between the three major groups of parties on 
the demand and supply sides of the audit services market – auditors, financial report 
preparers and financial report users. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper utilises the measurement of meaning framework 
(semantic differential analysis) originally proposed by Osgood et al. in 1957. The framework 
is used to investigate the extent to which there is shared meaning (agreement in 
interpretations) of the independence concept, in response to alternative audit engagement case 
contexts, between key parties to the financial reporting communication process. The study's 
research data was collected in the period March 2004-May 2005. 
 
Findings – Findings indicate a robust and stable single-factor cognitive structure within 
which the research participants interpret the connotative meaning of the auditor independence 
concept. An analysis of the experimental cases finds similarities in connotations 
(interpretations) of an audit firm's independence for the participant groups for most cases, 
with the exception of cases involving the joint provision of audit and non-audit (taxation) 
services. 
 
Research limitations/implications – The usual external validity threat that applies to 
experimental research generally applies to the study. That is, the results may not be 
generalisable to settings beyond those examined in the study. An important implication of the 
study is that it emphasises the continuing problematic nature of the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services, even in situations where the non-audit services comprise only 
traditional taxation services. 
 
Originality/value – The study is the first to examine the concept of auditor independence by 
means of the Osgood et al. measurement of meaning research framework using, as research 
participants, the three major groups on the demand and supply sides of the audit services 
market. 
Keyword(s): 
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1 Introduction 
Using an innovative research method relevant to but not widely applied in the accounting 
literature[1], this study provides insight into the extent to which there is shared meaning of 
the concept of auditor independence between the key parties on the demand and supply sides 
of the audit services market market – auditors, financial report preparers and financial report 
users. The measurement of meaning framework originally developed in the seminal work of 
Osgood et al. (1957) is used for the purpose of investigating perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
The accounting profession meets its public interest obligation by helping to ensure the proper 
functioning of the economy, including capital markets (Thornburg and Roberts, 2008). The 
provision of quality audits is central in meeting this public interest obligation. While 
definitions of audit quality emphasise an auditor's competence and independence (DeAngelo, 
1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1981), the second of these pillars, independence, has been 
subject to vigorous debate for a number of years since the early 2000s, due to major corporate 
collapses and perceived audit failures[2]. The debate on regulating auditors has centred on 
auditor independence and the relation between auditors and their clients (Bamber and Iyer, 
2007). The resulting changes in regulation, audit firm procedures and client relationships 
“likely constitute the greatest shift ever to occur in the auditing profession”, and this 
emphasises the importance of relevant research in this new environment (Bedard et al., 
2008). 
The independence pronouncements and standards issued by the major professional 
accounting organisations and regulatory bodies represent their attempts to provide guidance 
for auditors when evaluating their independence in practice. In so doing, these statements 
elaborate on the meaning of the concept of auditor independence. However, it may be 
difficult for auditors to effectively evaluate their independence in practice if their own 
interpretations (perceptions) of the concept differ from those of financial report users and 
other parties to the financial reporting communication process. These observations provide 
motivation for research into the question of whether there is shared meaning of the auditor 
independence concept. Research participants used in this experimental study to represent 
these key parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market are: 
 auditors, 
 financial report preparers and 
 financial report users. 
The research examines whether shared meaning exists across a number of alternative audit 
engagement case contexts. 
This study is the first to examine the concept of auditor independence by means of the 
Osgood et al. (1957) measurement of meaning research framework using, as research 
participants, the three major groups of parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit 
services market. The research makes a theoretical contribution to the collective knowledge 
and thinking about the connotative meaning of concepts generally and, more specifically, the 
connotative meaning of the concept of auditor independence. It achieves this by building on 
earlier research that has examined perceptions of auditor independence in different contexts. 
The study also adds to current theory by focusing on the three major groups of parties to the 
financial reporting communication process (auditors, financial report preparers and financial 
report users) in a single study. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The concept of auditor independence is discussed in the next 
section, followed by a discussion of the measurement of meaning research framework. The 
study's research hypotheses and experimental design are then explained. Findings on the 
cognitive structure within which research participant groups consider the concept of auditor 
independence are then presented, followed by a between-group comparison of the alternative 
experimental cases. A discussion section summarises the findings, contributions and 
limitations of the research, and a conclusions section completes the paper. 
2 The concept of auditor independence and its meaning 
To create demand for audit services, auditors must convince the market of their independence 
(as well as, of course, their competence). It has long been recognised that a reputation for 
independence is an auditor's greatest professional asset and that any negligence on an 
auditor's part will leave the auditor open to severe penalties in the form of, inter alia, a loss of 
reputation (Owens, 1941; Johnstone et al., 2001). Reputation serves as a collateral bond for 
independence, in that the reputation of an auditor found to be less independent than expected 
will be damaged and the present value of his or her audit services reduced (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). 
The pronouncements and standards of various professional and regulatory bodies require 
auditors to be independent both in fact (independence of mind) and in appearance 
(International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2002; Accounting Professional and 
Ethical Standards Board, 2008; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2010; 
Auditing Practices Board, 2010a, b, c; IESBA, 2010). Independence in fact exists when 
auditors are actually able to act with objectivity, integrity, impartiality and freedom from any 
conflict of interest. The Australian Corporations Act 2001 specifies a test for independence in 
fact where a conflict of interest situation will be considered to exist when: 
[…] the auditor, or a professional member of the audit team, is not capable of exercising objective and impartial 
judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit of the audited body (s. 324CD(1)(a)). 
Because the auditor's independence must be accepted by shareholders and other third parties, 
and as these parties usually have no way of ascertaining the presence or absence of 
independence in fact, independence must be apparent as well as real (Axelson, 1963; 
Shockley, 1982). In addition to being independent in fact, it is necessary that auditors are 
“seen to be independent by means of explicit and public signals that this is so” (Lee, 1993, p. 
99). This is the concept of independence in appearance, where the auditor should be 
perceived by others to be independent. The test for independence in appearance specified in 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001 specifies that a conflict of interest situation will exist 
when: 
[…] a reasonable person, with full knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that the 
auditor, or a professional member of the audit team, is not capable of exercising objective and impartial 
judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit of the audited body” (s. 324CD(1)(b)). 
Studies examining independence in appearance have generally sought to investigate 
perceptions of the independence of an auditor or audit firm in specific and varied situations, 
by surveying various groups of interested parties (Schulte, 1965; Briloff, 1966; Lavin and 
Libby, 1977; Firth, 1980; Reckers and Stagliano, 1981; Shockley, 1981; Pany and Reckers, 
1983, 1984; Lindsay et al., 1987; Bartlett, 1993; Lowe and Pany, 1995; Beattie et al., 1999). 
Studies examining independence in fact have generally examined proxies for potential 
independence impairment, although it is virtually impossible for causation to be imputed and 
clear implications are difficult to draw. Nevertheless, examples of proxies examined include 
audit fees, non-audit fees and knowledge spillovers (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Davis et 
al., 1993; Francis et al., 2005); propensity to issue modified audit opinions (for example, 
Wines, 1994; Craswell, 1999; Firth, 2002; Geiger and Rama, 2003); possible earnings 
management by auditee firms (Gore et al., 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; 
Reynolds et al., 2004); and profit restatements (Raghunandan et al., 2003; Kinney et al., 
2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). 
With reference to the meaning of the independence concept, independence has been 
described as a “common English word which has assumed a special significance in the 
linguistic structure of the accounting profession” (Bartlett, 1991, p. 12), but linguistic 
difficulties exist with the specialised usage of the word (Burton, 1980; Bartlett, 1991). In 
prescribing rules and concepts related to auditor independence, the relevant pronouncements 
provide explanations and guidelines related to the meaning of the independence concept. 
However, as with many common words that assume specialised connotations, Bartlett (1991) 
argues that the meanings attributed to the concept of independence are poorly specified. This 
raises questions as to whether the various parties to the financial reporting communication 
process agree on the meaning of the independence concept. 
It has been stated that auditor independence is an elusive notion that has been difficult to 
reduce to an easily understood or precise definition (Antle, 1984; Schuetze, 1994). This is 
because independence is subject to a multitude of individual contexts in practice. In 
considering actual independence as a state of mind, Lee and Kenley (1985, p. 75) argue that 
this is “not an ideal basis on which to place the confidence of the shareholders and other 
interested persons, mainly because of its intangible qualities.” It is for this reason that the 
appearance of independence is such a fundamental component of the concept of 
independence. However, prior research indicates that different parties tend to have alternative 
perceptions of the contexts and situations under which independence might be impaired 
(Briloff, 1966; Titard, 1971; Hartley and Ross, 1972; Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1980; Shockley, 
1981; Pany and Reckers, 1983, 1984; Lindsay et al., 1987). Hence, interpretations of the 
meaning of the independence concept can be subject to ambiguity and uncertainty. 
To be independent in appearance, the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by 
the International Ethics Standards Board of Accountants (IESBA) requires auditors to avoid: 
[…] facts and circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to 
conclude, weighing all the facts and circumstances, that a firm's, or a member of the audit team's, integrity, 
objectivity or professional skepticism has been compromised (IESBA, 2010, s. 290.8). 
This test of what a “reasonable and informed third party would be likely to conclude” is 
common to many of the professional and regulatory organisations' statements (Auditing 
Practices Board, 2010b; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2006; 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, 2008). However, what reasonable and 
informed parties would reasonably conclude to be acceptable or unacceptable is largely 
dependent on their interpretation of the meaning of the concept of auditor independence. 
This, in turn, affects their perceptions of an auditor's independence in individual contexts. 
For the “reasonable and informed third party” test to be effective, it is necessary for a shared 
understanding and interpretation of the meaning of the concept of auditor independence to 
exist. It may be difficult for auditors to effectively consider and evaluate their independence, 
particularly in borderline situations, if its exact meaning is subject to uncertainty or 
imprecision and if their own interpretation of the concept differs from that of financial report 
users and other parties to the financial reporting communication process. The reliance on the 
test of “what reasonable and informed third parties would be likely to conclude” specified in 
the various pronouncements indicates the relevance of research examining connotations of 
independence within individual contexts. 
3 The measurement of meaning research framework 
This study examines the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept utilising 
the measurement of meaning framework and semantic differential analysis. Developed by 
Osgood et al. (1957), semantic differential analysis represents a means for measuring the 
connotative meaning of concepts[3]. Connotative meanings include the emotional 
associations to particular concepts (Bruno, 1980) and evaluations of concepts (Bagranoff, 
1990). Connotative meaning implies some judgment of a concept (Flamholtz and Cook, 
1978) and gives rise to an individual's reactions to a concept (Bagranoff, 1990). Connotative 
meaning can be contrasted with denotative meaning, which is the ordinary or literal meaning 
of a concept and what it denotes[4]. Even with agreement between communicating parties as 
to denotative meaning, the parties can display different behaviours in their response to a 
symbol or concept (Osgood et al., 1957; Hronsky and Houghton, 2001)[5]. 
Pursuant to the semantic differential technique, bipolar adjectives (bipolar opposites) for the 
concept under investigation are constructed. Examples of bipolar adjectives (adjectival pairs) 
that have been utilised in prior accounting and auditing studies include exact-estimated, bad-
good, measurable-unmeasurable, necessary-unnecessary, objective-subjective, tangible-
intangible, static-dynamic and flexible-in flexible (Haried, 1972, 1973; Flamholtz and Cook, 
1978; Houghton, 1987a, b, 1988, 1997; Bagranoff, 1990; Houghton and Messier, 1990; 
Houghton and Hronsky, 1993; Bagranoff et al., 1994; McNamara and Moores, 1995; 
Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). The adjectival pairs are generally presented on a seven-point 
scale, with research participants indicating the position on each scale that reflects their 
perception of the relationship between the adjective and the concept. Marking the position on 
the semantic scale indicates the “direction and intensity” of the judgment of the concept 
(Osgood et al., 1957, p. 35). 
To measure connotative meaning, bipolar adjectives are selected that can depict or form 
factors or dimensions that define the structure within which the concept's meaning is held. 
This is referred to as cognitive structure, representing the dimensionality within which 
participants hold their meanings with respect to the concept or concepts under investigation 
(Houghton and Messier, 1990). The factors reflect the score profile or the semantic space 
associated with the concept, which can then be used to determine similarities or differences in 
meaning (Bagranoff, 1990)[6]. 
Osgood et al. (1957) proposed three dimensions for the general domain of meaning (i.e. for 
common concepts within ordinary fields of usage), with concepts considered within an E-P-A 
(Evaluative, Potency, Activity) structure. The evaluative dimension comprises semantic 
scales such as bad-good and adverse-beneficial, the potency dimension comprises scales such 
as strong-weak and incomplete-complete, and the activity dimension comprises scales such as 
active – passive and temporary-permanent[7]. 
The semantic differential has been extensively used in many disciplines, and its reliability, 
validity and effectiveness have been tested thoroughly (Heise, 1969; Houghton, 1988; 
Hronsky and Houghton, 2001; Wines, 2006). While, in comparison to other disciplines, 
semantic differential analysis has not been used extensively in accounting research, prior 
accounting studies using the method have indicated that it is well developed and reliable. 
These past studies have applied semantic differential analysis to determine interpretations of 
various accounting and audit report concepts and to determine whether there is shared 
meaning of those concepts between different groups (Houghton, 1987a, b, 1988, 1997; 
Houghton and Messier, 1990; Houghton and Hronsky, 1993; Bagranoff et al., 1994; 
McNamara and Moores, 1995; Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). 
Only one prior study has used the measurement of meaning framework to examine the 
concept of auditor independence. In an exploratory study, Wines (2006) employed semantic 
differential analysis to investigate the connotative meaning of the independence concept 
using final year undergraduate auditing students as research participants. The study 
confirmed the general validity and utility of the measurement of meaning framework for 
examining connotations of auditor independence. The present study applies the method more 
rigorously by investigating an expanded set of experimental scenarios and by using actual 
parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit market, rather than undergraduate 
students, as research participants. 
4 Hypotheses 
The concept of independence is fundamental to an audit. As established earlier, many current 
professional pronouncements specify a general test for auditor independence based on what a 
reasonable and informed third party would conclude to be acceptable. However, any 
conclusion on acceptability will be dependent on an individual's interpretation of the meaning 
of the independence concept, particularly in response to the various circumstances and 
conditions (independence threats and safeguards) that could potentially impact on an auditor's 
actual and/or perceived independence. For the concept of auditor independence to be 
effectively implemented in practice, it is necessary for a shared understanding of its meaning 
to exist between the various parties to the financial reporting communication process. 
To investigate whether shared meaning of the auditor independence concept exists between 
alternative parties to the financial reporting communication process, nine experimental cases 
specifying alternative audit engagement scenarios were developed. Potential independence 
threats and safeguards to address those threats were manipulated in the cases. The nine cases 
are explained in Section 5.1. 
Research participants represented the three major groups of parties on the demand and supply 
sides of the audit services market: auditors, financial report preparers and financial report 
users. The measurement of meaning framework was employed to provide insight into the 
cognitive structure within which the concept of independence was considered by the three 
participant groups. The method can provide insight into whether there is shared meaning of 
the concept of auditor independence, both within and between the three research participant 
groups. As a minimum, this would require the three groups to interpret the meaning of the 
independence concept within the same general cognitive (factor) structure. The first 
hypothesis is therefore stated, in the null form, as: 
H 0 1. Parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market interpret the 
connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept within a shared cognitive structure. 
The research method can also examine whether there are any differences between the three 
research participant groups in measured meanings of auditor independence (connotations of 
independence) for the alternative experimental cases. That is, factor scores can be compared 
for identical experimental case scenarios between different participant groups. Shared 
meaning of the concept in individual cases would be absent if significant between-group 
differences exist. Any such differences are of practical significance as they signify a lack of 
agreement between the alternative parties in response to the specified independence threat 
and safeguard scenarios. 
Prior survey research suggests that financial report users are generally more concerned with 
potential independence threat situations than members of the accounting profession (Briloff, 
1966; Hartley and Ross, 1972; Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1980; Shockley, 1981; Lindsay et al., 
1987). The expectation is therefore that, in comparison to the auditor participants, the 
financial report preparer group would have similar views on auditor independence in each the 
various audit case scenarios while the financial report user group would be more likely to 
have more adverse views. The study's second hypothesis, comparing the auditor and preparer 
groups, is therefore stated in the null form as: 
H 0 2. For each of the study's experimental cases, there are no differences in measured 
meanings (connotations) of auditor independence between the auditor and preparer groups. 
The third hypothesis, comparing the auditor and user groups, is stated in the alternate form 
as: 
H A 3. For each of the study's experimental cases, there are differences in measured meanings 
(connotations) of auditor independence between the auditor and user groups. 
5 Research instrument 
In utilising the measurement of meaning framework to examine the concept of auditor 
independence, selection is required of: 
 alternative experimental audit case scenarios to enable investigation of the meaning of 
the concept across alternate settings; 
 the semantic differential scales to be utilised to measure connotative meaning; and 
 research participants. 
5.1 Experimental audit cases 
The study's experimental audit case scenarios were designed to enable investigation of any 
variability in measured meaning between the research participant groups. Nine cases were 
developed representing alternative hypothetical, but realistic, audit engagement scenarios. 
The first experimental case represented an audit engagement scenario in which no threats to 
auditor independence were specified. The eight further cases varied the audit engagement 
scenarios with respect to potential independence threats and safeguards to address those 
threats. The aim was to select experimental cases in which variability in the semantic scales 
would be expected. The experiment was conducted in an Australian setting, but the cases 
were selected to have international applicability. 
The nine experimental cases were: 
 Case 1. No auditor independence threats. 
 Case 2. Interlocking directorships among audit clients. 
 Case 3. Longer period of audit firm tenure with four year audit partner rotation 
period. 
 Case 4. Longer period of audit firm tenure with seven year audit partner rotation 
period. 
 Case 5. Provision of a high level of non-audit (taxation) services by the accounting 
firm's taxation services division with additional PCAOB oversight safeguard. 
 Case 6. Provision of a high level of non-audit (taxation) services by the accounting 
firm's taxation services division (without additional PCAOB oversight safeguard). 
 Case 7. Provision of a low level of non-audit (taxation) services by the accounting 
firm's taxation services division (without additional PCAOB oversight safeguard). 
 Case 8. Presence of a former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee with local 
(within the audit firm) independence board. 
 Case 9. Presence of a former audit firm partner as a director of the auditee (without 
local independence board safeguard). 
Further details of the cases with respect to the auditee company, the audit firm and the 
experimental manipulations are presented in Appendix 1. In addition, the basis for the 
manipulations and the related prior literature is discussed in Appendix 2. The nine 
experimental cases encompass a wide variety of audit engagement scenarios with respect to 
potential independence threats and safeguards, and these would be expected to elicit 
variability in participant responses. 
5.2 Semantic differential scales 
The 22 semantic scales used in previous accounting and auditing measurement of meaning 
studies were utilised in the research[8]. The research instrument response sheet containing 
these scales is reproduced in Appendix 3. Houghton (1997) pre-tested these scales and found 
they covered multi-dimensional space, exhibited stability, had relevance and did not induce 
research participant fatigue. These scales were specifically used for the auditor independence 
concept with student participants, and found to be reliable, in the Wines (2006) exploratory 
study. Utilisation of these scales therefore provides consistency with the prior research. 
Use of the 22 semantic scales can be contrasted with prior research examining perceptions of 
auditor independence. Prior research has tended to ask a single question to summarise the 
respondent's perception of the auditor's independence, such as “to what extent do you 
consider the auditor to be independent in this situation?” The major advantage of the 
measurement of meaning method is that participants respond to multiple scales. These scales 
can then be analysed to identify any alternative dimensions of meaning for the concept and 
any differences in these multiple scales and dimensions between different parties. 
5.3 Alternate versions of the research instrument 
Because of time and potential fatigue considerations, individual research participants could 
not have been expected to complete a research instrument comprising all nine experimental 
cases. Accordingly, based on a decision that an individual participant could realistically 
respond to three cases in a reasonable time without potential contamination by fatigue, three 
major alternate versions of the research instrument, each comprising three cases, were 
utilised[9]. 
About 18 alternate versions of the research instrument were developed, comprising six 
variations within each of the three major alternate versions. The six variations allowed 
presentation of the three experimental cases in each research instrument in all possible orders 
to protect against order effects. Three alternate orders of the semantic differential scales were 
also presented within the different versions of the research instrument. This involved 
switching around the 22 scales and flipping the end points of the individual scales. The 
alternate versions of the research instrument are summarised in Appendix 4. 
6 Research participants 
The study's research participants, selected to represent auditors, financial report preparers and 
financial report users, are described in the following sub-sections. On the supply side of the 
audit market, auditors comprise the first group of research participants. It is auditors, both as 
individuals and as members of audit firms, who are required to maintain their independence 
in accordance with relevant professional and statutory requirements. 
The research sample comprised 80 auditors[10]. Panel A of Table I shows that 49 auditors 
(61.3 per cent) were from three Big Four audit firms and 31 (38.8 per cent) from five Second 
(Mid) Tier firms. Therefore, the auditors were drawn from a cross-section of firms. 
Panels B and C of Table I present details of gender and experience for the auditor 
participants. To ensure that auditor participants would be aware of, and would have been 
exposed to, the types of independence issues that are the subject of this study, experienced 
auditors were selected as participants. The average audit experience of the auditor research 
participants was 10.3 years, with a minimum of three years and a maximum of 31 years. 
On the demand side of the audit market, financial report preparers represent the second 
research participant group. Preparers are required to interact with auditors in preparing, and 
making decisions on, the content of audited financial reports, as well as in the course of the 
auditor's gathering of audit evidence from sources within the auditee entity. It is therefore to 
be expected that preparers would be cognisant of audit, including independence, issues. An 
audit enhances the credibility of financial reports and assists in lowering an auditee's cost of 
capital by reducing information risk (Houghton, 2002). A credible, independent audit is 
therefore in an auditee entity's interests, and preparers are the individuals having a major 
responsibility for the content of financial reports. 
The research sample comprised 71 preparers[11], with details provided in Table II. Panel A 
shows the roles of the participants. Panel B shows the type of entity with which the 
participants were associated, all of which were audited. Panel C shows participant gender 
details. 
The average length of experience of the preparer participants in their “current occupation” 
was 11.5 years. Panel D of Table II presents a frequency distribution of the years of 
experience of the preparer participants. All except five of the 70 preparers responding to this 
question had at least three year's experience in their current occupation[12]. Given the 
employment roles of the preparers and their years of experience in those roles, the preparer 
participants can be considered to represent relatively experienced preparers. 
Also on the demand side of the audit services market, financial report users represent the 
third research participant group. Report users are a major party to the financial reporting 
communication process as recipients of financial reports. An audit aims to establish the 
credibility of communicated financial reports and create rational belief and confidence in 
those reports for the benefit of report users. 
The financial report user participants, summarised in Table III, represented professional bank 
analysts and private investors. The final sample of 69 user participants comprised 19 bank 
analysts and 50 private shareholders[13]. 
The 19 professional bank analysts were research, credit and financial analysts from two of the 
four major Australian banks[14]. The 50 shareholder research participants were members of 
the Australian Investors' Association (AIA)[15]. To be considered to have a requisite level of 
familiarity with financial reports, shareholder participants, in response to a question asking 
for the degree to which they were familiar with company financial reports, needed to provide 
a response of at least three on a five-point scale (where one represented “Not familiar” and 
five represented “Very familiar”). 
The study's research data was collected in the period March 2004-May 2005. 
6.1 Sample size 
Factor analysis of semantic scales is used to determine the cognitive structure within which 
the meaning of the relevant concept is interpreted. A sample must be large enough for this 
purpose to enable reliable correlation estimation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Sample size 
considerations apply also in this study for comparison of the individual experimental cases, as 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to compare factor scores for the different cases across 
the research participant groups. With the three participant groups providing responses to nine 
experimental cases[16], there are 27 cells for analysis. Assuming a minimum of 20 responses 
in each cell, this would result in 540 observations in total. This would exceed the required 
sample size for factor analysis purposes of 220 calculated by applying the formula of Hair et 
al. (1998) [17] and of 500 as specified by Comrey and Lee (1992) as being “very good”. 
A summary of the research sample by experimental case and participant group is presented in 
Table IV. With a total sample size of 658 case responses and greater than 20 responses for 
each of the nine cases for each group, minimum sample size requirements are exceeded. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for the study's data was 0.956, a level 
considered to be “marvellous” (Kaiser, 1970). 
7 Initial data analysis 
Comparison of the semantic scale data was first conducted using multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) to compare the raw responses to the 22 scales. Analysis of raw scores 
is not a measure of difference in meaning within the Osgood et al. (1957) framework, but 
does indicate whether there are differences in responses between the three participant groups 
and between the alternative experimental cases. Results indicated highly significant 
differences between the three groups of research participants (p <0.001), between the 
alternative experimental cases (p <0.001) and in the interaction terms (p <0.013)[18]. This 
suggests that there is variation, between the participant groups and the experimental cases, in 
factor scores derived from the semantic scales when applying the measurement of meaning 
method[19]. 
8 Findings: cognitive structure 
Consistent with the prior measurement of meaning literature, the primary data reduction 
process used for the semantic differential scale data was common factor analysis (principal 
axis factoring) with varimax (orthogonal) rotation (Osgood et al., 1957; Houghton, 1987a, b, 
1988; Houghton and Messier, 1990; Houghton and Hronsky, 1993; Hronsky and Houghton, 
2001). Eigenvalues and the scree plot resulting from the factor analysis are presented in 
Figure 1. 
Application of the simple scree test suggests anywhere between a one- and five-factor 
solutions (Hair et al., 1998)[20]. A frequently used criterion in deciding how many factors to 
retain in a factor solution is to accept all those with eigenvalues exceeding one (Kaiser, 1960; 
Hair et al., 1998), although it is generally agreed that this criterion tends to result in the 
acceptance of too many factors (Lee and Comrey, 1979; Everett, 1983)[21]. Three factors 
have eigenvalues exceeding one, although the first factor extracted dominates with an 
eigenvalue over five times as large as the second factor. 
H01 proposes that the three research participant groups interpret the connotative meaning of 
the auditor independence concept within a shared cognitive structure. As three factors have 
eigenvalues greater than one, and as Osgood et al. (1957) propose a three-dimensional E-P-A 
structure for the general domain of meaning, a three-factor model was the first factor solution 
attempted. The conventional technique for assigning scales to factors by selecting those with 
factor loadings exceeding 0.5 was adopted. This resulted in 19 of the 22 scales loading on the 
three factors, with no individual scale loading on more than one factor[22]. 
To assess whether the three-factor structure was robust and stable, factor comparability 
analysis was used. This method of analysis was designed originally to test between-group 
comparability (Nunnally, 1978), but can be used also to test comparability within groups 
(Everett and Entrekin, 1980). In comparing two or more groups or sub-groups, separate factor 
analyses are run for each group/sub-group. Alternate sets of factor scores are derived by 
applying the factor score coefficients from each analysis to all responses. Correlations 
between the sets of factor scores for each factor are then calculated to determine 
comparability, with only high correlations indicating a robust and stable (shared) factor 
structure. Research has tended to adopt a cut-off correlation of around 0.894, indicating 80 
per cent shared variance, to indicate a robust and stable factor structure (Houghton, 1987a, b, 
1988). 
Factor comparability analysis was used to test for both between-group and within-group 
stability of the three-factor solution[23]. Results (Table V) indicate that the three-factor 
solution was not robust and stable. Panels A to C of Table V show a general lack of between-
group comparability. Factor 1 exhibits the required level of comparability between preparers 
and users only. Factors 2 and 3 do not exhibit any between-group stability at the required 
level. There is also a lack of within-group comparability when considering all three factors 
for each of the three participant groups (Panel D), with only Factor 1 for auditors and Factor 
3 for preparers having split-half correlations of at least 0.894[24]. 
Accordingly, two- and one-factor solutions were also extracted and tested for factor 
comparability. Like the three-factor model, the two-factor solution lacked both between- and 
within-group stability, and therefore could not be considered robust and stable[25]. 
The single-factor solution is presented in Panel A of Table VI. The factor comparability 
analysis results presented in Panels B and C indicate this single-factor model to be robust and 
stable, both between the three research participant groups and within each of the individual 
groups[26]. In addition, the Cronbach alpha for the 22 scales was 0.942, supporting the robust 
and stable nature of the single-factor model. 
H 0 1 is therefore supported. The three research participant groups interpreted the connotative 
meaning of the auditor independence concept within a shared cognitive structure. While this 
was not a three-factor E-P-A structure, factor comparability results indicate the existence of a 
shared, single-factor cognitive structure. Discussion of the nature of this single dimension of 
meaning follows. 
A total of 17 scales (six evaluative, seven potency and four activity scales) have factor 
loadings exceeding 0.5. The scales loading most highly, with factor loadings exceeding 0.8, 
comprise three evaluative and three potency scales. The high loadings for the evaluative and 
potency scales are intuitively reasonable when considering the auditor independence concept. 
For the independence concept, the good, safe and beneficial evaluative scales are similar in 
effect to the strong, real and complete potency scales. 
The activity scales have the least impact. The planned activity scale does load highly with a 
factor loading of 0.749, but the other activity scales with loadings exceeding 0.5 are the last 
three of the factors, and the three remaining activity scales have loadings of less than 0.5[27]. 
In summary, it can be concluded that, for the auditor, preparer and user research participants, 
the evaluative and potency dimensions of meaning in particular, but also the activity 
dimension to a lesser extent, are highly related for the auditor independence concept. 
Osgood et al. (1957) suggested that the evaluative factor generally plays the dominant role in 
meaningful judgments, and this has been supported by many subsequent studies. The relative 
weights of the three E-P-A factors have also been fairly consistent, with evaluation generally 
accounting for approximately double the amount of variance due to either potency or activity 
(Osgood et al., 1957, p. 38). However, the very high proportion of variance explained by the 
single factor in the present study, and the robust and stable nature of this factor, supports the 
conclusion that the various evaluative, potency and activity scales work together in providing 
interpretations (connotations) of auditor independence in individual situations. 
The results of the present study can be compared also with previous accounting and auditing 
studies using the same 22 semantic scales. In the prior studies in which eigenvalues were 
published[28], the first-factor eigenvalues were not as high as the value of 10.5 found in the 
present study. In studies deriving three or four-factor solutions, the highest eigenvalue was 
6.8 (Hronsky and Houghton, 2001). In accounting studies deriving single-factor solutions, the 
highest eigenvalue was 9.1 for shareholder participants (Houghton, 1987a). The eigenvalue of 
the first factor extracted in Wines (2006), where students were used as research participants 
to examine the independence concept, was 8.6. Accordingly, the high eigenvalue for the first 
factor in this study reinforces the conclusion that a single-factor model is appropriate and that 
the alternative E-P-A scales are highly related when considering the connotative meaning of 
the auditor independence concept. 
The extraction of a factor combining alternative E-P-A scales is also not unique to the present 
study. Many prior accounting and auditing studies have extracted dominant factors 
comprising alternative dimensions. For example, the dominant factor extracted in Houghton 
(1987a) comprised four potency, three evaluative and one activity scale. In Houghton and 
Hronsky (1993), the dominant factor comprised four evaluative, three activity and one 
potency scale, while Hronsky and Houghton (2001) extracted a dominant factor of four 
potency, two evaluative and one activity scale. Also, in Houghton (1987b), the dominant 
factor was a potency, not evaluative, one. 
Osgood (1976, p. 37) emphasised the significance of the evaluative factor and noted that this 
attitudinal variable appeared to be primary in human judgment. He suggested that the greater 
the emotional or attitudinal loading of the concept being judged, the greater the tendency of 
the semantic framework to collapse into a single, combined dimension (Osgood, 1976, p. 38). 
This study indicates that this is the situation for the auditor independence concept. The 
auditing research literature and professional standards refer to perceptions of auditor 
independence, and this represents an attitudinal evaluation of independence in specific 
contexts. Interpretations of independence particularly involve evaluations of its strength, a 
potency dimension. Accordingly, the potency of independence is highly related to its 
evaluative dimension, and this is evident in the study's findings. 
9 Findings: between-group comparisons of experimental cases 
Factor comparability analysis confirmed a shared, single-factor cognitive structure. A 
comparison of differences in factor placements for each case between the three participant 
groups is presented in this section. Consistent with the prior literature, factor placements are 
calculated by multiplying factor scores by 100[29]. Factor placements for each case and for 
each of the participant groups are shown in Table VII. The table also presents one-way 
ANOVA results from between-group comparisons of factor placements for each of the nine 
cases. Shared meaning of the concept of auditor independence would be absent if significant 
between-group differences exist in factor scores for identical audit engagement scenarios. 
H 0 2 hypothesised no differences in measured meanings (connotations) of auditor 
independence between the auditors and the financial report preparer groups for each of the 
experimental cases. The results of post hoc testing presented in the second last column of 
Table VII indicate that this is the case for seven of the nine cases. H 0 2 is therefore supported 
for these seven cases, and the auditors and preparers agree on the auditor's independence for 
each of these cases. 
However, contrary to H 0 2, there are significant differences between the auditors and 
preparers in the factor placements for Cases 5 and 7[30]. These cases for which significant 
differences exist represent two of the three cases indicating the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit (taxation) services to the audit client. In comparison to the positive factor 
placements for the auditors (+24 and +36 for Cases 5 and 7, respectively), the placements are 
significantly lower for the preparers (−72 and −18, respectively). The preparers therefore 
have more negative connotations (perceptions) of the auditor's independence, in comparison 
to the auditor participants, for these two cases. 
H A 3 hypothesised significant differences in measured meanings (connotations) of auditor 
independence between the auditors and the financial report user groups for the experimental 
cases. Based on prior research, it was expected that users would be more likely to have more 
adverse views on auditor independence in response to the experimental case scenarios. 
However, the results of post hoc testing presented in the final column of Table VII indicate 
that this is the case for only three of the nine cases. H A 3 is therefore supported for only these 
three cases. 
Differences between the auditors and users are evident for each of Cases 5, 6 and 7. These 
three cases each comprised the joint provision of audit and non-audit (taxation) services. As 
hypothesised, the post hoc testing results show factor placements to be significantly lower for 
users in comparison to auditors for each of the three non-audit services cases. The auditor and 
user groups therefore do not agree on the auditor's independence for these three cases, with 
users having more negative connotations of the auditor's independence for each case. 
In summary, the analyses presented in this sub-section show there are no significant between-
group differences for any of the experimental cases except the three non-audit service 
provision cases. With the exception of the non-audit services cases, shared meaning of the 
independence concept between the three participant groups exists under the stated 
independence threat and safeguard scenarios. These cases for which there were no significant 
between-group differences are Case 1 (no independence threats), Case 2 (interlocking 
directorships), Cases 3 and 4 (longer period of audit firm tenure), and Cases 8 and 9 (ex-audit 
firm partner as a director of the auditee). Inc contrast, factor placements were significantly 
lower for users in comparison to auditors for all three non-audit services cases, while 
placements were significantly lower for the preparers in comparison to the auditors for two of 
these three non-audit services cases. 
10 Discussion 
Findings suggest that the auditor, preparer and user participant groups generally exhibit 
shared meaning of the auditor independence concept. A shared single-factor cognitive 
structure was identified. This indicates that the evaluative and potency scales in particular, 
but also the activity scales to a lesser extent, are highly related for the auditor independence 
concept. This supports the contention of Osgood (1976) that the greater the emotional or 
attitudinal loading of the concept being judged, the greater the tendency of the semantic 
framework to collapse into a single, combined dimension. The independence concept is one 
that does evoke considerable emotion as evidenced by, for example, the questioning of 
auditor independence following the corporate collapses earlier this century. 
The absence of significant between-group differences in measured meanings (connotations) 
of auditor independence for the majority of the alternative experimental cases is further 
evidence of a considerable level of shared meaning. The three participant groups were in 
agreement in their interpretation of the audit firm's independence, by reference to factor 
placements within the shared cognitive structure, for all experimental cases with the 
exception of the three non-audit services scenarios. Significant differences in connotations of 
the audit firm's independence were found for the non-audit services cases between auditors 
on the one hand and users and preparers on the other. This was the situation even though the 
non-audit services were specified to comprise only traditional tax compliance and tax 
planning services. More will be said on this later. 
10.1 Contributions of the research 
The study is the first to examine the concept of auditor independence by means of the Osgood 
et al. (1957) measurement of meaning research framework using, as research participants, the 
three major groups of parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market. 
The research makes a theoretical contribution to the collective knowledge and thinking about 
the connotative meaning of concepts generally and, more specifically, the connotative 
meaning of the concept of auditor independence. It has achieved this by building on earlier 
research that has examined perceptions of auditor independence in different contexts. The 
study also adds to current theory by focusing on the three major groups of parties to the 
financial reporting communication process (auditors, financial report preparers and financial 
report users) in a single study. 
A further major contribution stems from the study's illustration of the manner in which the 
measurement of meaning research method can be utilised to prospectively evaluate the 
impact on interpretations of any proposed changes to auditor independence rules. In 
developing new or revised rules, the method could be used by professional bodies, regulatory 
bodies and researchers to assess the reaction of various interested parties to any revisions 
prior to their finalisation. The method could be used also to assess reactions to variations of 
proposed measures. Further research on the method's use for this purpose is therefore 
suggested. 
Important implications arise from the finding of significant differences in interpretations of 
the auditor's independence between auditors and users in the cases specifying the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services. Users were more concerned than auditors with the 
audit firm provision of non-audit services even when these were specified to comprise only 
traditional taxation services. Non-audit services in the form of taxation services have not 
generally been seen to represent a high independence risk and are generally viewed positively 
as a logical add-on to the audit (Francis, 2006)[31]. However, the study's findings for the 
non-audit services cases reinforce the problematic nature of the audit firm provision of even 
taxation services for the auditing profession. This is a significant finding with important 
implications. It is possible that, due to the corporate collapses of the early 2000s and the 
resulting questioning of the independence of auditors, various parties to the financial 
reporting communication process, but not auditors themselves, have become more sensitive 
to the joint provision of even normal types of tax compliance and tax planning services. 
10.2 Limitations of the research 
Access to a sample of participants of suitable size across the three participant groups required 
a number of alternative data collection methods. Research instruments, as noted earlier, were 
administered to the research participant groups by a variety of means. The procedures 
reduced the control of the researcher over the administration process, but did succeed in 
achieving a sample size exceeding minimum size requirements. 
A further potential validity threat arises from possible heterogeneity of respondents. 
However, from the viewpoint of the measured meaning of the auditor independence concept, 
it is not expected that possible heterogeneity in each of the study's participant groups will 
have represented a serious validity threat. The finding of a shared cognitive structure within 
which the concept of auditor independence was considered by each participant group 
suggests that heterogeneity of respondents does not constitute a major problem. 
Finally, a potential external validity threat is that which applies to experimental research 
generally. Results may not be generalisable to settings beyond those examined in the study, 
including to real world rather than experimental settings (Shadish et al., 2002). 
11 Summary and conclusions 
Auditor independence has been subject to vigorous debate as a result of corporate collapses 
and perceived audit failures earlier this century. Various inquiries have been held and reports 
issued, and various independence pronouncements and regulations internationally have been 
revised and reissued. These developments provide motivation for research examining 
interpretations of the meaning of the independence concept, and the measurement of meaning 
framework, originally developed in the psychology literature by Osgood et al. (1957), is 
utilised for this purpose. Auditors, financial report preparers and financial report users were 
used as research participants. The objective was to determine, within an experimental 
research framework, whether shared meaning of the auditor independence concept exists 
between these parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market. 
Findings show that the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept was 
considered by the three research participant groups within a simple (single factor) shared 
cognitive structure. With respect to the individual experimental audit engagement case 
scenarios, the three participant groups were in agreement in their interpretation of the audit 
firm's independence for the individual cases specifying: 
 no independence threats, 
 interlocking directorships, 
 a longer period of audit firm tenure (with four- or seven-year audit rotation periods), 
and 
 a former audit partner of the audit firm being a director of the audit client (both with 
and without a local independence board). 
This shared cognitive structure and agreement in connotations of auditor independence for 
these cases suggests that the meaning of the independence concept was generally shared by 
the three groups. 
However, significant between-group differences were found in the study's non-audit services 
case scenarios, signifying a lack of shared meaning between the relevant groups for these 
cases. This finding suggests that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services continues 
to represent a key auditor independence concern. In particular, these concerns extend to the 
provision of taxation services to audit clients, an area not generally seen to represent a high 
independence risk. 
 
Graphic 1 
 
Figure 1Eigenvalues and scree plot 
 
Table IAuditor research participants 
 
Table IIPreparer research participants 
 
Table IIIUser research participants 
 
Table IVSummary of research sample by case and group 
 
Table VFactory comparability analysis: three-factor model 
 
Table VISingle-factor model 
 
Table VIIOne-way ANOVA of factor placements 
 
Table AISummary of experimental case scenarios 
 
Table AIIAlternate versions of the research instrument 
Notes 
1. Major prior accounting and auditing studies utilising the measurement of meaning 
framework employed in this paper have been Haried (1972, 1973), Flamholtz and 
Cook (1978), Houghton (1987a, b, 1988, 1997), Bagranoff (1990), Houghton and 
Messier (1990), Houghton and Hronsky (1993), Bagranoff et al. (1994); McNamara 
and Moores (1995), Hronsky and Houghton (2001) and Wines (2006). 
2. These include, for example, Cendant, Enron, Global Crossing, Microstrategy, 
Sunbeam, Tyco International, Waste Management, WorldCom and Xerox in the USA, 
Parmalat in Italy, and Harris Scarfe, HIH Insurance and One.Tel in Australia. 
3. Connotative meaning is also referred to as affective meaning, being closely related to 
the behavioural dimensions of emotion or feeling (Osgood, 1962, 1969; Osgood et al., 
1975). 
4. The denotative meaning of a symbol (word, concept, phrase or some other linguistic 
form) involves the communication of an objective description or definition, rather 
than a subjective attitude or emotion (Adelberg and Farrelly, 1989). 
5. In this respect, the various professional and regulatory pronouncements can be 
considered to provide statements of the ordinary or literal (denotative) meaning of the 
independence concept, but the concept may nevertheless have different connotations 
for alternative parties. 
6. For example, by reference to factor scores, different concepts can be examined to 
determine whether they have the same or different meanings. Similarities or 
differences in concept meanings between individuals, groups and particular contexts 
can also be investigated. 
7. These three dimensions of meaning for general concepts have been supported in many 
prior studies, including across different cultures (Osgood, 1962, 1969; Osgood et al., 
1975). 
8. These 22 semantic scales have been developed by, and used in, Houghton (1987a, 
1988, 1997), Houghton and Hronsky (1993), Bagranoff et al. (1994), Hronsky and 
Houghton (2001) and Wines (2006). 
9. In the Wines (2006) study, student participants completed a similar research 
instrument comprising three cases in a maximum of 45 minutes. 
10. The research instrument was administered with auditors either personally by the 
author within the relevant audit firm or by means of the audit firm distributing 
instruments to participants and subsequently collecting them. All auditors were 
located in Melbourne, Australia. 
11. The research instrument was administered with preparers by mail. Preparers were 
located in  Melbourne, Australia. 
12. The five preparers with less than three year's experience all had at least a university 
bachelors degree and were all members of a professional accounting association. One 
of the five was aged in the 26-30-year age group, one was in the 31-35-year age 
group, while the other three were at least 36 years of age. Research results were 
substantively identical whether or not these five preparers' responses were included in 
the analyses conducted. The one non-respondent to the experience question was a 
financial controller. 
13. The two categories of financial report users were utilised as participants to achieve a 
suitable sample size of users with a requisite level of experience. For the bank analyst 
group of users, the research instruments were forwarded to individual contacts in the 
banks, located in Melbourne (Australia), who distributed them to participants and 
subsequently collected them. For the shareholder group of users, copies of the 
research instrument were distributed by the author after a presentation on an unrelated 
topic to AIA members at a monthly meeting and at the AIA's annual conference. 
These were held in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Perth (Australia). Completed 
research instruments were returned by mail. 
14. Panel C of Table III shows that all except one analyst had at least two years 
experience in their “current occupation”. The participant who had between 1.5 and 
two year's experience indicated that he dealt with audited financial reports relatively 
frequently in his occupation (response of four on a five-point scale where one 
represented “Never” and five represented “Frequently”) and that the use of audited 
financial reports in his occupation was important (response of four on a five-point 
scale where one equalled “Unimportant” and five equalled “Very important”). This 
participant was not a member of a professional accounting association, but was aged 
between 26 and 30 and held a bachelors degree. Research results were substantively 
identical whether or not this participant was included in the analyses conducted. 
15. The AIA was formed in 1991 with the aim of representing “the interests of private 
investors across the broad spectrum of investment products available in the retail 
market” (AIA, 2008a). The association promotes itself as “a strong and active 
fellowship of members who are committed to protecting and promoting investor 
interests” (AIA, 2008b). Membership, which is restricted to individuals, numbers 
approximately 2,200. 
16. As noted earlier, this is achieved by using three major versions of the research 
instrument, each containing three experimental cases. 
17. Hair et al. (1998) suggest an acceptable sample size of at least ten times as many 
observations as there are variables to be analyzed. With the current study's 22 
semantic differential scales, a ten to one ratio would suggest a required sample size of 
220. 
18. These levels of significance were consistent under Pillai's Trace, Wilks' Lambda, 
Hotelling's Trace and Roy's Largest Root. 
19. Manipulation checks were included in the research instrument. Across all 658 case 
responses, there were 34 (5.2 per cent) incorrect responses to the relevant 
manipulation check questions. Results were substantively identical whether or not 
these participants' responses were included in the analyses conducted. Results in the 
paper are reported including all 658 case responses. 
20. The scree test involves plotting eigenvalues against factors, with the shape of the 
resulting curve being used to determine the cutoff point. The maximum number of 
factors to extract is indicated by the point at which the curve begins to straighten out 
and form a straight line with a near horizontal slope (Hair et al., 1998). 
21. Lee and Comrey (1979) argue that the criterion results in the unrealistic elevation of 
the amount of common factor variance analysed and the distortion of the conclusions 
drawn from the investigation. 
22. The three scales which did not load on any factor in the three-factor model were the 
estimated – exact scale (factor loading 0.328), the unmeasurable – measurable scale 
(factor loading 0.231), and the inflexible – flexible scale (factor loading −0.335). 
23. To enable within-group factor comparability testing, the participants in each group 
were randomly split into two halves, with each half balanced by the experimental 
cases. 
24. Factor analysis was conducted also using (a) maximum likelihood extraction with 
varimax rotation (b) principal axis factoring extraction with oblique (direct oblimin) 
rotation and (c) maximum likelihood extraction with oblique (direct oblimin) rotation. 
Factor comparability results consistently indicated that a three-factor model was not 
robust and stable. 
25. The between-group correlations ranged between 0.819 and 0.667 for Factor 1 and 
between 0.515 and −0.120 for Factor 2. While within group stability was exhibited for 
Factor 1 for all three participant groups, this was not the case for Factor 2, where 
within-group correlations ranged between 0.805 and −0.446. The various alternative 
extraction and rotation methods conducted for the three-factor model were also 
undertaken, with none of these finding a shared factor structure. 
26. Within-group factor comparability analysis also indicated the single-factor structure 
was comparable within (a) the auditor group of participants when dissected between 
Big Four and Second Tier auditors (b) the preparer group when dissected between 
accountants and the other preparers, and (c) the user group when dissected between 
bank analyst and shareholder participants. 
27. It is also relevant to highlight that all seven potency scales load on the factor. Only 
two of the eight evaluative scales do not load. Given the compulsory nature of auditor 
independence, it is not surprising that the non-loading evaluative scales are the 
discretionary – required and unnecessary – necessary ones. 
28. These studies were Houghton (1987a, b, 1988, 1997), Houghton and Messier (1990), 
Houghton and Hronsky (1993), Hronsky and Houghton (2001) and Wines (2006). 
29. See Houghton (1987a, b, 1988, 1997), Houghton and Messier (1990), Houghton and 
Hronsky (1993), Bagranoff et al. (1994), Hronsky and Houghton (2001), Wines 
(2006) and Hair et al. (1998). As factor scores are standardised to have a mean of zero 
and standard deviation of one, the factor placements reported here have a mean of 
zero and standard deviation of 100. 
30. The lower factor placements for preparers in comparison to auditors for these two 
cases indicates that, using the terminology of the semantic scales, preparers 
considered the audit firm's independence to be, for example, weaker, riskier, more 
incomplete, less beneficial, more unplanned, less objective and more temporary. 
31. Subject to pre-approval by the company's audit committee, tax services are 
specifically allowed in the USA, with some exceptions, under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. Tax services are also generally allowed in Australia, Canada, the European 
Union and the United Kingdom (Department of the Treasury, 2006). 
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Table AI 
Appendix 2. Basis for experimental manipulations 
Case 2: Interlocking directorships 
Interlocking directorships exist when directors sit on a number of common boards, creating 
networks of inter-company ties (Mizruchi, 1996; Jubb, 2000). Director-auditor interlocks 
occur when the audit firm audits several companies where interlocking directorships are 
present. These have been found to be a significant factor in explaining auditor choice and 
length of auditor tenure (Davison et al., 1984; Jubb, 2000; Houghton and Jubb, 2003a; 
Courtney and Jubb, 2005). 
Self-interest threats could arise when interlocking directorships exist among audit clients as 
the audit firm is dealing not only with a single entity but with a “family” of companies (Jubb, 
2000; Houghton and Jubb, 2003a). Interpersonal relationships between directors and auditors 
are potentially greater when interlocking directorships exist. Audit firms also stand to lose 
multiple audits if they lose an audit client with interlocking directorships. Accordingly, the 
presence of interlocking directorships among an audit firm's clients has the potential to 
negatively affect auditor independence. Case 2 indicated that three non-executive directors of 
the auditee were also non-executive directors of other companies audited by the incumbent 
audit firm, creating interlocks between the auditee company and two other companies. 
Cases 3 and 4: longer period of audit tenure 
It has long been suggested that lengthy periods of auditor tenure pose potential threats to 
auditor independence (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
(Cohen, M.F., Chairman), 1978). The IESBA code states that familiarity threats can arise 
from a long association between senior audit personnel and assurance clients (IESBA, 2010, 
ss. 290.150-290.155), and behavioural bonds can develop between the auditor and auditee 
(Latham et al., 1998). The auditor may become less likely to use innovative audit procedures 
and may fail to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism (Raghunathan et al., 1994). 
Further, an incumbent auditor captures client-specific quasi-rents and has incentives to lower 
quality in future periods to retain the client (DeAngelo, 1981b). Because considerable 
learning costs are associated with a new client, the later periods of auditor tenure tend to be 
periods of relative stability and positive cash flows, which could motivate the auditor to not 
report misrepresentations in the client's financial report (Raghunathan et al., 1994). 
While mixed results have been found, a number of studies report a negative association 
between perceptions of auditor independence or audit quality and tenure length (Firth, 1980; 
Knapp, 1991; Sainty et al., 2002; Dao et al., 2008). Research has also examined proxies for 
actual audit quality and found a negative association with auditor tenure length (St. Pierre and 
Anderson, 1984; Palmrose, 1989; Raghunathan et al., 1994; Chi and Huang, 2005; Azizkhani 
et al., 2007). 
The experimental scenarios contained in the study's Cases 3 and 4 indicated the audit firm 
had been retained for the previous nine years, while all other cases indicated a four-year 
tenure period. The nine-year tenure period was selected for Cases 3 and 4 to differentiate 
clearly auditor tenure length. Sainty et al. (2002) and Raghunathan et al. (1994) classified 
audit tenure periods exceeding four and five years respectively as long, while Frankel et al. 
(2002) classified a tenure period exceeding eight years as long. Also, a nine-year tenure 
period exceeds the average tenure length reported in most prior studies in this area. For 
example, average tenures were 7.2 years in Reynolds et al. (2004), 8.5 years in Ghosh and 
Moon (2005), and 8.8 years in Mansi et al. (2004). 
Cases 3 and 4: period of audit partner rotation 
The major safeguard that has been recommended to deal with the threat of a lengthy period of 
audit tenure involves some form of auditor rotation. The major recent legislative and 
professional developments have largely prescribed audit partner, rather than audit firm, 
rotation. For example, in Australia the Corporations Act 2001 (ss. 324DA to 324 DD) 
requires the lead and review auditors to rotate after five successive years. The rotation period 
can be extended to up to seven years on application from the auditor where the rotation 
obligations would impose an unreasonable burden (s. 342A). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (s. 
203) prescribes rotation of the lead, coordinating or review partner after five years. The 
SEC's rules also require rotation after seven years for certain partners other than the lead, 
coordinating or review partner (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003). Rotation 
periods of five years are specified for applicable audits in the United Kingdom and Canada 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2009; Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2003). Seven-
year rotation periods are specified in the IESBA code (s. 290.151) and in the European 
Union's rules (Department of the Treasury, 2006). 
In the presence of the longer nine-year audit firm tenure period in Cases 3 and 4, a four-year 
rotation period for the engagement partner was specified in Case 3 while Case 4 specified a 
seven-year rotation period. The seven-year period was chosen as it represents the longest of 
the various partner rotation periods specified in the regimes discussed above. The four-year 
rotation period was chosen for the shorter rotation period scenario to signify a period of 
slightly lesser length than the five years stipulated in most of the regimes discussed above. 
Cases 5, 6 and 7: provision of non-audit (taxation) services 
The effect on auditor independence of the joint supply of audit and non-audit services has 
been the subject of debate and research since at least the 1960s (Cony, 1961; Mautz and 
Sharaf, 1961; Trueblood, 1961; Hylton, 1964), and the spate of corporate collapses of the 
early 2000s brought a renewed focus to the issue (Wyatt, 2004). The research suggests 
generally that non-audit services do not impair independence in fact but could impair 
independence in appearance (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Ikin, 2005; Francis, 2006; 
Schneider et al., 2006). 
A number of recent reports have been prepared, and legislation enacted, addressing the non-
audit services issue. The major development in the USA has been the prohibition of a range 
of non-audit services with enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The IESBA code prohibits 
auditors undertaking non-audit services that effectively involve them performing 
management functions or making management decisions for the client (IESBA, 2010, s. 
290.159). The code also specifies nine categories of non-audit services that pose a high risk 
to independence (IESBA, 2010, ss. 290.167-290.219), these being similar to the categories 
prohibited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
The experimental scenarios in the study's Cases 5, 6 and 7 specified auditor provision of non-
audit services in the form of taxation services. Tax services have not generally been seen to 
represent a high independence risk, and Francis (2006) highlights they are now the largest 
non-audit service on most audit engagements and generally viewed positively as a logical 
add-on to the audit. Subject to pre-approval by the company's audit committee, tax services 
are specifically allowed in the USA, with some exceptions, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Tax services are also generally allowed in Australia, Canada, the European Union and the 
United Kingdom (Department of the Treasury, 2006). 
However, there have been some independence concerns raised recently regarding taxation 
services. The PCAOB adopted rules in 2005 prohibiting an audit firm providing tax planning 
and advice on certain types of potentially abusive tax transactions (Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, 2005), but this did not change the position with respect to 
normal tax compliance and tax advice services. The rules are similar in the United Kingdom, 
with some prohibitions specified in relation to the promotion of tax structures or products 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2010c). The IESBA's code also prohibits taxation services if the 
tax advice's effectiveness depends on a particular accounting treatment or presentation 
(IESBA, 2010). 
The experimental scenarios contained in the study's Cases 5, 6 and 7 indicated that the audit 
firm's taxation division had provided, with the pre-approval of the audit committee, 
additional taxation services to the auditee over the four-year audit tenure period. These 
services were specified to comprise tax compliance services and tax planning advice, with 
fees from each of these categories being approximately equal. Cases 5 and 6 indicated a high 
level of annual taxation services over the four-year period at three to four times the audit fee. 
Case 7 indicated a lower level of annual tax services at approximately one-half the audit fee. 
Case 5: additional PCAOB oversight 
As explained above, Cases 5 and 6 indicated a high level of non-audit (taxation) services. An 
independence safeguard introduced in Case 5, but not Case 6, was additional external audit 
oversight. The study was conducted in the Australian setting, and Case 5 indicated that the 
company had raised debt and equity in the United States and hence that the audit of the 
company, and the Australian auditor and audit firm, were subject to additional oversight by 
the PCAOB. The PCAOB's specified role is to “oversee the audit of public companies […] in 
order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, s. 101(a)). Major 
oversight functions of the Board include a continuing program of inspections (s. 104) and 
investigations and disciplinary proceedings (s. 105). The aim of the Case 5 experimental 
manipulation was to convey the notion of an additional layer of rigorous external public 
oversight. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifies detailed sanctions (s. 105(4)). 
Cases 8 and 9: ex-partner as director of audit client 
It is not unusual for audit staff to be recruited for employment, including directorships, with 
audit clients, with this practice referred to as the revolving door (Menon and Williams, 2004; 
Geiger et al., 2005). The IESBA code considers that this circumstance can create self interest, 
familiarity and intimidation threats (IESBA, 2010, s. 290.143). Research suggests that 
potential independence concerns can arise from client employment effects (Koh and 
Mahathevan, 1993; Parlin and Bartlett, 1994; Menon and Williams, 2004). Further, the 
corporate collapses earlier this century drew attention to the issue. For example, in the USA, 
former senior audit partners and staff of the incumbent audit firm were directors, officers or 
in senior positions at Enron, Global Crossing and Waste Management (Menon and Williams, 
2004; Geiger et al., 2005). In Australia, three of the directors of HIH Insurance, including the 
chairman, were former partners of the incumbent audit firm (HIH Royal Commission, 2003). 
To reduce the threat of independence impairment in these situations, various regimes have 
enacted cooling-off periods. These place limitations on the circumstances under which a 
former audit partner or staff member can undertake employment with an audit client. For 
example, the IESBA code, the United Kingdom ethical standard and the Australian 
Corporations Act specify two-year cooling off periods for various key audit partners and staff 
(IESBA, 2010; Auditing Practices Board, 2010a; Department of the Treasury, 2006). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (s. 206) makes it unlawful for an accounting firm to perform an audit if 
the audit client's chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting 
officer or any person serving in an equivalent position had previously been employed by the 
accounting firm and participated in the audit in any capacity during the one-year period 
preceding the date of initiation of the audit. 
The experimental scenarios in the study's Cases 8 and 9 specified a former audit firm partner 
being a director of the audit client. These cases stated that the director resigned from the audit 
firm 12 months earlier after 17 years with the firm, becoming director of the auditee eight 
months earlier. The director had not previously been involved in the audit of the auditee, and 
hence was not subject to any of the cooling-off requirements referred to above[1]. However, 
the two cases did specify that the former partner (now director) had worked closely with the 
current audit engagement partner when previously with the audit firm. 
Case 8: local (internal) independence board 
An additional independence safeguard introduced in Case 8 was the presence of a local 
independence board within the audit firm. Auditor oversight can occur in a number of ways, 
and recent arguments have been advanced for additional internal oversight within audit firms 
themselves. This was proposed in Australia in a submission to the Australian Commonwealth 
government's Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA, 2002) by Houghton 
(2002), and further espoused by Houghton and Jubb (2002, 2003b). The proposal argues for 
audit firms having a critical mass of audits of publicly traded companies to establish their 
own independence board. The board would have the authority to define, review and decide on 
all threats and potential threats to independence within the audit firm, and would comprise a 
panel of expert persons not associated with the firm. The board, comprising between three 
and seven persons, could include experts from fields such as auditing, commercial law, 
professional services, accounting and auditing standard setting and accounting policy making. 
The board would have a power of veto over independence issues and ultimate control of 
acceptance and retention of audit engagements. 
The experimental scenarios contained in the study's Cases 8 and 9 indicated a former audit 
firm partner being a director of the audit client. Case 8, but not Case 9, specified the presence 
of a local independence board within the audit firm. The case specified that the firm, to 
emphasise and make visible quality controls for independence, had established a separate 
independence board 18 months earlier. The board was specified to comprise a panel of four 
expert persons not otherwise commercially associated with the firm. These members were a 
commercial lawyer, a retired former partner of another Big Four accounting firm, a university 
auditing professor and a former chairperson of the Australian Accounting Standards Board. 
The independence board was specified to have specific authority to define, review and decide 
upon all threats and potential threats to auditor independence, with the aim of removing 
decision making in respect of such independence matters from those within the firm who had 
a commercial or vested interest in the outcome. The aim of the experimental manipulation 
was to convey the notion of an additional quality control process comprising a further layer 
of oversight. 
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Note 
1. In Australia, the HIH Royal Commission (2003, p. 177) advocated a two-year cooling off 
period for a former partner who was not directly involved in the audit of the client, but that 
proposal was never enacted. 
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